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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
.S. public schools are in the early stages of a revolution in how they go 
about evaluating teachers.  In years past there was little more than intuition 
and anecdote to support the view that teachers vary in their quality.  The 
little data that was available came from ratings of teachers carried out by school 
principals, a process that typically resulted in nearly all teachers receiving 
uniformly high ratings.  It is nearly impossible to discover and act on performance 
differences among teachers when documented records show them all to be the 
same. 
A new generation of teacher evaluation systems seeks to make performance 
measurement and feedback more rigorous and useful.  These systems incorporate 
multiple sources of information, including such metrics as systematic classroom 
observations, student and parent surveys, measures of professionalism and 
commitment to the school community, more differentiated principal ratings, and 
test score gains for students in each teacher’s classrooms.  The latter indicator, test 
score gains, typically incorporates a variety of statistical controls for differences 
among teachers in the circumstances in which they teach.  Such a measure is called 
teacher value-added because it estimates the value that individual teachers add to 
the academic growth of their students. 
Value-added has a prominent role in new evaluation systems for several 
reasons, including a burgeoning research literature that demonstrates that value-
added measures predict future teacher ability to raise student test scores better 
than principal ratings and teacher attributes such as years of experience or 
advanced coursework.  Further, federal law and policy in the George W. Bush and 
the Obama administrations has incentivized states to develop the assessment 
systems and databases that allow value-added to be calculated, and to incorporate 
value-added information as a significant factor in evaluating teacher performance.  
For example, a commitment to developing new teacher evaluation systems 
incorporating value-added information was required of states competing for the 
billions of dollars of Race to the Top funds that were available under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act during the first year of the Obama administration.   
Although much of the impetus for new approaches to teacher evaluation comes 
from policymakers at the state and national levels, the design of any particular 
teacher evaluation system falls to the roughly 16,000 school districts and 5,000 
independent public charter schools in the U.S. that have the responsibility for 
developing human resource policies and procedures for their instructional staff.  
Because of the immaturity of the knowledge base on the design of teacher 
evaluation systems and the local politics of school management, we are likely to 
see considerable variability among school districts in how they go about 
evaluating teachers—even as most move to new systems that are intended to be 
more informative than those used in the past. 
If an individual state or the federal government wishes to require or incentivize 
local education agencies to evaluate teachers more rigorously and meaningfully, 
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how can they do so while honoring each district’s authority to do it its own way?  
And how can individual school districts benchmark the performance of their 
teacher evaluation system against the performance of evaluation systems in other 
districts or against the previous version of their own evaluation system?  In other 
words, how can teacher evaluation systems be compared, one to another? 
This report addresses the comparison of teacher evaluation systems in the 
context of a particular administrative and legislative challenge:  How a state or the 
federal government could achieve a uniform standard for dispensing funds to 
school districts for the recognition of exceptional teachers without imposing a 
uniform evaluation system on those districts.  We address and provide practical 
procedures for determining the reliability of local teacher evaluation systems.  We 
then demonstrate that the reliability of the evaluation system determines the 
proportion of teachers that a system can identify as exceptional.  Thus a school 
district wanting to accurately recognize the top quartile of teachers as highly 
effective would only be able to identify some portion of the top 25 percent with 
confidence given the lack of perfect reliability in the measures of teacher 
effectiveness that are deployed by the district.  Further the portion of the top 
quartile that could be identified would be greater in an identically sized district 
that has more reliable measures.   
Our approach to answering the question of how the federal government or a 
state could dispense funds to local districts to reward exceptional teachers is that 
the amount of funding should be scaled to the reliability of each district’s 
evaluation system.  Thus school districts with more reliable systems would be able 
to accurately identify a greater proportion of their teachers as exceptional and 
would receive funding in line with those numbers.  The procedures we propose by 
which the reliability of a district-level teacher evaluation system could be reported 
to and evaluated by state or federal officials are straightforward and simple.  They 
do not necessitate an intrusive federal or state role.  
 Although we provide a worked solution to a specific administrative challenge, 
i.e., state or federal funding for district-level recognition programs for 
exceptionally effective teachers, the underlying approach we offer has more 
general uses in a variety of circumstances in which decisions have to be made 
about teachers based on imperfect data.  For example our approach is easily 
adapted to the district-level task of identifying low-performing teachers for 
intensive professional development or to the state- or federal-level task of setting 
minimal standards for the reliability of teacher evaluation systems.  Further, by 
demonstrating how the reliability of non value-added measures of teacher 
performance such as classroom observations is an important component of the 
overall reliability of a teacher evaluation system, our approach provides a spur to 
the development of multi-faceted methods for evaluating how well teachers are 
doing their jobs.    
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Background 
The vast majority of school districts in the U.S. presently use teacher evaluation 
systems that result in nearly all teachers receiving uniformly high ratings.  For 
instance, a recent study by The New Teacher Project of twelve districts in four 
states revealed that more than 99 percent of teachers in districts using binary 
ratings were rated satisfactory whereas 94 percent received one of the top two 
ratings in districts using a broader range of ratings.1  As Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan put it, “Today in our country, 99 percent of our teachers are above 
average.”2
The reality is far different from what these evaluations would suggest.  We 
know from a large body of empirical research that teachers differ dramatically 
from one another in effectiveness.  The failure of today’s evaluation systems to 
recognize these differences means that human resource decisions are not as 
productive or fair as they could be if they incorporated data that meaningfully 
differentiated among teachers.  To put it plainly, it is nearly impossible to act on 
differences between teachers when documented records show them all to be the 
same. 
    
A new generation of teacher evaluation systems seeks to make performance 
measurement and feedback more rigorous and useful.  As such, the measures 
should demonstrate meaningful variation that reflects the full range of teacher 
performance in the classroom.  New evaluation systems typically incorporate 
several sources of information on teacher performance.  For example, the 
Hillsborough County Public School District in Florida utilizes classroom 
observations of teacher performance, student ratings of their teachers, direct 
assessments of teacher knowledge, and student test score gains in each teacher’s 
classrooms as components of their teacher evaluation system.3  The District of 
Columbia Public Schools evaluates teachers based on student test score growth in 
each teacher’s classroom, a classroom observation measure, a rating of 
commitment to the school community, student test score gains for the whole 
school, and a measure of professionalism that takes into account factors such as 
unexcused teacher absences and late arrivals.4
Many of these new systems incorporate student test score growth in ways that 
aim to capture the contribution teachers make toward student achievement.  This 
contribution is often referred to as teacher value-added.  There are various 
methods for estimating teacher value-added, but all typically entail some variant 
of subtracting the achievement test scores of a teacher’s students at the beginning 
of the year from their scores at the end of the year, and making statistical 
adjustments to account for differences in student learning that might result from 
student background or school-wide factors outside the teacher’s control.  These 
adjusted gains in student achievement, also known as value-added, are compared 
across teachers.  
 
The prominence of value-added in new evaluation systems is a result of several 
influences.  Among them is the commonsensical view that because the principal 
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role of teachers is to enhance student learning, a central measure of their job 
performance should be how much their students learn.  Another influence is a 
burgeoning research literature on teacher classroom effectiveness that has focused 
on value-added measures and demonstrated that those measures predict future 
teacher performance, as measured by value-added in subsequent years, better than 
teacher attributes such as years of experience or advanced coursework.   
The broader reform community in education has taken up the cause of 
meaningful teacher evaluation grounded in value-added measures of effectiveness.  
Incentives for school districts to evaluate teachers based on value-added are central 
to the Teacher Incentive Fund that was authorized and funded during the George 
W. Bush administration and also to the Obama administration’s proposed 
replacement, the Teacher and Leader Innovation Fund.  Further, the Obama 
administration made a state’s commitment to measuring teacher performance 
using value-added a requirement for success in the competition for $4.3 billion in 
the Race to the Top fund.  The appeal of teacher value-added measures is further 
strengthened by their wide availability as a result of the No Child Left Behind 
Act’s requirement for testing of all students in reading and mathematics in grades 
3-8 coupled with federal funding to states to develop longitudinal data systems to 
serve as central state repositories of the resulting student assessment data.   
The availability of student test scores allows, within each state, a common and 
face-valid yardstick for measuring teacher effectiveness across all schools in the 
state—an attribute that is not present for the other presently available sources of 
information on teacher effectiveness that individual school districts might employ, 
e.g., supervisor ratings or classroom observations.  Thus for a variety of reasons 
value-added measures of teachers’ contribution to student growth have come to be 
central to popular and powerfully driven efforts to improve U.S. public schools. 
Researchers have pointed out that value-added estimates for individual 
teachers fluctuate from year to year and can be influenced by factors over which 
the teacher has no control.  We have previously issued a report that describes some 
of the imperfections in value-added measures while documenting that: a) they 
provide one of the best presently available signals of the future ability of teachers 
to raise student test scores; b) the technical issues surrounding the use of value-
added measures arise in one form or another with respect to any evaluation of 
complex human behavior; and c) value-added measures are on par with 
performance measures in other fields in terms of their predictive validity.5
The present report offers advice on how to determine the degree to which an 
evaluation system is successful in the face of those imperfections and limitations.  
We address the connection between the reliability of an evaluation system and its 
ability to accurately identify exceptional teachers for special action, e.g., for a 
salary bonus if they are exceptionally good or for remedial action or dismissal if 
  Our 
report recommended the use of value-added measures as a part of teacher 
evaluation but in the context of continuous improvement of those measures and 
awareness of their imperfections and limitations. 
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they are exceptionally bad.   Reliability is not the only issue arising from the use of 
value-added measures. In particular, designers of evaluation systems and 
policymakers have to address biases that are introduced by differences in the 
contexts in which different teachers work.  However, in this report, we focus on 
the issue of reliability.  
We build our presentation around a proposal we put forth in a previous report, 
America’s Teacher Corps, calling for the creation of national recognition for teachers 
deemed effective based on approved state and local evaluation systems.6
• Promoting the use of teacher evaluation systems to identify and reward 
excellence 
  The three 
design features of that proposal were: 
Whereas most of the focus of teacher evaluation systems using value-added 
has been on the identification and removal of ineffective teachers, we believe that 
such systems can also have a major impact by identifying and promoting 
excellence through recognition of exceptionally strong classroom performance.   
• Flexibility on the components that would need to be a part of a teacher 
evaluation system and how those components would be weighted 
There is no consensus on the degree to which teacher performance should be 
judged based on student gains on standardized achievement tests.  Supporters of 
test-based measures would seek to expand standardized testing to virtually all 
grades and subjects and weight the results heavily in personnel decisions about 
teachers.  Opponents question the validity of state assessments as measures of 
student learning and the accuracy and reliability value-added indicators at the 
classroom level.  They typically prefer observational measures, e.g., ratings of 
teachers’ classroom performance by master teachers.  Our proposal for a system to 
identify highly-effective teachers is agnostic about the relative weight of test-based 
measures vs. other components in a teacher evaluation system.  It requires only 
that the system include a spread of verifiable and comparable teacher evaluations, 
be sufficiently reliable and valid to identify persistently superior teachers, and 
incorporate student achievement on standardized assessments as at least some 
portion of the evaluation system for teachers in those grades and subjects in which 
all students are tested. 
• Involving a light hand from levels of government above the school 
district 
A central premise of our previous report is that buy-in from teachers and 
utilization of their expertise are most likely if the design of an evaluation system 
occurs at a level at which they feel they have real influence.  In most cases this will 
be the local school district where they work.  We expect wariness from teachers, 
even with respect to a system intended only to identify and reward excellence, if 
the design of that system is subject to considerable control from Washington or the 
state level.  Further, we doubt that there is much of an appetite within Congress for 
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the creation of a federal bureaucracy devoted to the fine-grained oversight of state 
and local teacher evaluation systems.  And we doubt there is sufficient capacity 
within state-level education bureaucracies to carry out such oversight even if there 
is a political will to do so.  
Suppose a state or the federal government wanted to fund a program whereby 
individual school districts could provide a bonus or other rewards to their 
exceptionally effective teachers. This requires a system of evaluation that 
meaningfully differentiates among teachers based on their performance.  Similarly, 
suppose that a state wanted to encourage districts to differentiate the teaching 
profession so that new teachers started with one set of responsibilities but could be 
promoted into more complex and challenging roles as they demonstrated 
capability in the job.  This reform, again, requires evaluations to determine 
different levels of teaching performance.  Given the great variation in design and 
quality of district evaluation systems and the practical and political constraints on 
states or the federal government producing uniformity in those systems, how 
could state or federal funds for such recognition programs be fairly distributed?   
In this report we address the question of how a state or the federal government 
could achieve a sufficiently uniform standard for dispensing funds for the 
recognition of exceptional teachers without imposing a uniform evaluation system 
on participating school districts.  In particular, we address the role of the state or 
federal government in assessing the reliability of local evaluation systems.  We 
demonstrate that the quality of the measures and the quantity of data affect 
reliability and determine the number of teachers a system can identify as 
exceptional.  Instead of a school district wanting to recognize the top quartile of 
teachers being able to identify 25 of every 100 teachers as being in the top 25 
percent, we show that when imperfections in the measurement system are taken 
into account, only some portion of the true top 25 percent can be identified with 
confidence.  Further, that portion would be greater in an identical sized district 
that has better measures and more data. 
Although we provide a solution to what may seem to be a narrowly-focused 
administrative challenge, i.e., funding a teacher recognition program from the state 
or federal level, the underlying approach we offer has more general uses to which 
we will turn in the final section of this report. 
 
How state or federal teacher recognition programs can 
accommodate district evaluation systems of differing quality 
A major source of debate about the methods of estimating teacher performance is 
the statistical reliability of such measures and whether they are sufficiently precise 
to support attaching consequences to them such as pay for performance and tenure 
decisions.7
Our concern in this report is with the reliability of the evaluation system as a 
whole.  We focus on the information that is necessary to determine the extent to 
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which teacher evaluation systems are likely to result in classification errors (e.g., 
classifying teachers as highly effective when they are not or failing to classify them 
as highly effective if they are).  For this discussion we will not address the potential 
problem of systematic bias in which the evaluations for some teachers are 
systematically too high or too low in comparison to the teachers’ true effectiveness.  
Clearly, a desirable evaluation system will adjust for differences in the classrooms 
and schools in which teachers work to reduce or eliminate such biases.  We focus 
here primarily on the reliability (or precision) of the estimates.   
No evaluation approach will be exact for all teachers and thus designers and 
those using the evaluations should consider the implications of the imprecision for 
the decisions they make.  If designers were to dismiss any evaluation systems that 
had error in identification, they would have to dismiss all possible systems and 
end up with no evaluation at all.  Given that error is a fact in evaluation, 
understanding the implications of this error and how error varies across different 
approaches to evaluation can be helpful in choosing an effective approach. 
In what follows, we describe how policymakers can determine the number of 
teachers that would accurately and inaccurately qualify to be singled out for 
special treatment given the power of the system to predict future teacher 
performance and the level of teacher exceptionality that is the criterion for special 
treatment.  We will describe how to estimate the extent of misclassification, as well 
as the average difference in later effectiveness between groups identified by the 
evaluation.  We also address how the tolerance that policymakers are willing to 
permit for misclassification plays a role in the number of teachers that can be 
accurately identified as exceptional.  These subjects go to the heart of the issue of 
the performance of district-level teacher evaluation systems relative to each other, 
and provide the basis for a solution to the challenge of building a fair system for 
distributing state or federal funds to support district-level programs for teacher 
recognition.  
 
The factors that influence the accuracy of teacher identification 
systems 
Using teacher performance measures to identify teachers for special treatment is, 
fundamentally, an exercise in prediction.  For example, the use of measures of past 
performance of novice teachers to decide who will be tenured assumes that the 
better-performing novice teachers will be better teachers after receiving tenure 
than would the lower-performing teachers had they been given tenure.  Likewise, 
the common district-level practice of selecting a small number of teachers as 
“master teachers” to serve as role models and supports for beginning or struggling 
teachers involves the implicit assumption that those teachers are persistently high 
performers who will continue to be stars in the classroom.  Thus the use of teacher 
evaluation measures to identify different levels of teacher performance in one 
period as a basis for personnel action nearly always assumes that identification in 
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one period signifies something about how teachers will perform in the future.  
Our approach to judging the relative performance of teacher evaluation 
systems rests on determining their ability to predict future performance.  We 
propose to judge teacher performance measures based on the degree to which they 
accurately estimate future teacher performance from past years of teaching, i.e., 
how reliable they are as a predictor of future effectiveness.     
A more reliable measure is one that will yield similar answers when it is used 
to take more than one reading of the same phenomenon. We use the correlation of 
value-added measures from one period to the next as one component of a gauge of 
reliability, but the degree to which a performance measure in one period predicts 
performance in the future will depend on both the degree to which the measure is 
related to true performance and the extent to which true performance is stable from 
one period to the next.  Differences between the measurement of performance and 
true performance are considered measurement error.  If there is a significant 
amount of measurement error such that the performance measure is only loosely 
related to true performance, we would refer to it as “noisy.”  If on the other hand 
true performance changes from one period to the next, even a perfect measure of 
performance in one period will not accurately predict performance in the next 
period.  There is no reason to think that true teacher performance is completely 
stable from one period to the next, e.g., teachers who are quite effective one year 
may encounter problems at home or changed work conditions that lead them to be 
less effective in a subsequent year, and teachers may become more effective over 
time as a result of experience (learning on the job) and professional development.   
For an evaluation system to be useful, the true performance of teachers must be 
sufficiently stable over a period of a few years for predictions of future 
performance from past performance to be worthwhile. This assumption is 
buttressed, in the case of value-added measures, by the fact that value-added 
measures from one period predict student achievement in future periods.8
In addition to picking up variation in true performance from year to year, any 
measure of performance will have error, i.e., will be an imperfect reflection of true 
teacher effectiveness.  However, while all measures have error, some measures are 
likely to capture enough of the true differences in teacher effectiveness to be useful.  
Indeed, the same studies that permit an inference that there is stability in the true 
performance of teachers also demonstrate that the measures used in those studies 
are sufficiently reliable to capture at least some of those true performance 
differences.     
  It is 
also buttressed by anecdotal evidence that some teachers are simply more effective 
than other teachers and, as a result, parents work to get their children into these 
teachers’ classrooms.  For this discussion, we will assume that true performance, 
while variable from year to year, is stable enough for there to be meaningful 
differences in the average effectiveness of teachers over time. 
Because we can neither know the precise degree of error in a given measure of 
performance nor the actual stability of true teacher ability from one period to the 
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next, the correlation of a school district’s measures of teacher performance from 
one period to the next cannot be judged against an absolute standard.  Thus, our 
approach to judging the quality of evaluation systems must be relative: if we use 
common yardsticks we can demonstrate that some evaluations systems are more 
reliable than others and by what degree. 
 
Value-added as the common yardstick   
If we are to judge the quality of teacher evaluation systems relative to each other, 
there must be some common measure across those systems that is sensitive to true 
differences in teacher performance.  Without such a common measure, the quality 
of teacher evaluations systems cannot be meaningfully compared across districts.   
The focus of this paper is on using such a common measure to assess the 
reliability of evaluation systems.  However, it is important to keep in mind that 
reliability is not useful unless a measure also has validity.  To produce valid scores 
a measure must pick up differences in teacher performance that are important to 
student learning.  Thus, while a teacher's height is strongly correlated from one 
year to the next, can be measured precisely, and is available for every teacher in 
the country, it would not be a good common measure for our purpose because it 
does not capture teacher performance.  Similarly, suppose district A’s evaluation 
system produced scores for individual teachers based on a weighted average of 
years of teaching experience, route into teaching, certification status, receipt of 
advanced degrees, and principal ratings of performance on a pass-fail system.  The 
correlation of these scores for the district’s teachers from one year to the next 
would be high, i.e., they would be very reliable.  Suppose that district B deployed a 
very different evaluation system based on classroom observations, value-added 
test scores, and student surveys.  The year-to-year correlation of evaluation scores 
would likely be much lower for district B than for district A.  However, that would 
not mean that district B had the weaker evaluation system.  In fact, the measures 
used by district A have been shown empirically to be only weakly related to 
classroom performance whereas those used by district B have a stronger evidence 
base.  A system for determining whether a district’s evaluation system passes 
muster in terms of recognizing exceptional teacher performance should not be 
designed to favor year-to-year reliability disconnected from what is being 
measured. 
If we are to judge the quality of teacher evaluation systems relative to each 
other, we have to have a common measure or a set of common measures across 
those systems that are sensitive to true differences in teacher performance.  
Without such common measures, it is difficult to meaningfully compare the 
quality of teacher evaluations systems.  A number of different measures of teacher 
effectiveness have at least basic face validity for measuring teacher effectiveness, 
including: direct measures of teaching such as teachers' scores on observational 
protocols of teaching quality; measures of student learning while in a teacher's 
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classroom such as value-added measures; principals' ratings; and survey-based 
assessments of teachers by students and parents.  
Currently value-added measures are, in most states, the only one of these 
measures that is available across districts and standardized.  As discussed above, 
value-added scores based on state administered end-of-year or end-of-course 
assessments are not perfect measures of teaching effectiveness, but they do have 
some face validity and are widely available.  In our analysis below we use value-
added as the metric for comparing the quality of evaluation systems; however, we 
are limited in our goal of comparing systems by the limitations of these measures.  
As other measures become widely available and as the tests on which the value-
added measures are based become better aligned with societal goals, our ability to 
judge and compare systems of evaluation will improve 
Note that we do not recommend that states or the federal government be 
prescriptive about the components that districts should include in their teacher 
evaluation systems or how they should be weighted or how the information from 
those systems should be used for high-stakes personnel decisions.  We use growth 
in student achievement scores on standardized assessments as an outcome 
measure to judge the relative quality of teacher evaluation systems but should 
other standardized measures of teacher performance that have clear face validity 
come to be used in public schools statewide in the future, they could augment or 
replace the use of standardized achievement test gains without changing the 
conceptual and computational model we put forward.  For example, one could 
imagine measures of student engagement or assessments of so-called soft skills 
finding their way into statewide assessments of student outcomes. 
 
An approach based on relative strength of prediction 
The goal of this report is to outline an approach for states to use in judging district-
developed teacher evaluation systems.  Better systems of evaluation will have a 
number of features—five that we outline here. First, they will differentiate 
teachers.  If there is little differentiation between teachers’ evaluations (e.g., if 95 
percent of teachers receive the same rating) then the system will not be useful.  
Second, this differentiation should not be driven by observable characteristics that 
are unlikely to be strong predictors of effectiveness.  For example, if teachers were 
ranked based on their years of experience, there would be differentiation but that 
differentiation would not have face-validity as a measure of effectiveness, even 
though we might imagine reasons (e.g., ease) that could lead to school leaders 
differentiating teachers based on experience. Third, the evaluations should be 
predictive of future evaluations of effectiveness.  That is, the system should be able 
to identify teachers who not only performed well in the current year but who 
continue to perform well in subsequent years.  Fourth, the system should employ 
multiple measures that include not only value-added measures on state-level 
standardized tests but formal or informal observation measures and/or other 
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measures of student progress.  This need for multiple measures arises, at least in 
part, from the measurement error in value-added measures and the low 
proportion of teachers for which value-added measures are available.  It also arises 
from the importance of goals for students that are not captured by available tests.  
Finally, the system should be applicable to all teachers.  It is unlikely that all 
measures used in the evaluation system will apply to all teachers.  For example, 
teachers serving some groups of special education students may not have 
appropriate value-added from student achievement measures because the tests do 
not sufficiently capture their contribution.  However, even though these teachers 
do not have all the metrics, a good system will provide enough alternative metrics 
to reliably assess these teachers.  In what follows, we concentrate on the fourth and 
fifth features of a strong evaluation system. 
Value-added measures have the benefit of being based on student outcomes.  If 
we believe that a teacher’s effectiveness is, by definition, the contribution that he or 
she makes to students, then a student performance measure is ideal.  However, 
there are clear drawbacks with current value-added measures.  In particular, they 
are usually based on student outcomes over a very narrow set of domains; they 
have substantial measurement error; and they are usually only available for a 
small subset of teachers.  As a result, a system based only on value-added 
measures would not be helpful for identifying the most effective teachers in a 
district.  
In order for districts to develop useful systems of evaluation they will need 
meaningfully to supplement the state test score data.  One approach to this 
supplementation would be to develop other measures of student performance that 
more fully capture the range of outcomes that the district cares about and provides 
information on the learning in classrooms of a greater share of the district’s 
teachers.  A second approach to this supplementation is to collect data other than 
student performance data that gives insights into teaching effectiveness.  This data 
could include formal or informal assessments from school leaders or parents or 
students as examples.  In a system that collects these three types of information, 
some teachers are likely to have data on all three types of measures—state value-
added, additional value-added, and non-student-based measures—while other 
teachers may only have data on a single type of measure.   
The measures based on information aside from the state tests have advantages.  
For example, non test-based measures are likely easier to collect for a wider range 
of teachers.  In addition, they may provide direct information for teachers on how 
to improve.  On the other hand, these measures are not directly linked to student 
benefits, which is the ultimate goal of teaching.  Similarly, student performance-
based measures that use information other than performance on the state tests 
allow a fuller coverage of content areas than do state test-based measures but may 
be based on invalid or unreliable instruments.    
We see a two-pronged approach for how states judge the non state-test 
measures utilized by a district’s evaluation system.  In the first prong, states may 
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approve a measure or a type of measure for use as a core part of the evaluation 
system.  For example, the state may approve any value-added measures based on 
student test performance, even those not using the required state exams.  
Alternatively, a state may choose a common observational protocol collected in a 
standard way to be used as a core part of any evaluation system.  Yet, even with 
state allowance of measures other than value-added on the state tests, each 
district’s evaluation system will likely utilize a range of other measures such as 
principal evaluation.  Whether a district’s evaluation system passes muster for the 
purpose of identifying effective teachers will depend in many cases on districts 
demonstrating the validity of these non state-test measures.  We propose an 
approach that uses measures of teacher effectiveness for teachers that have both 
core (e.g., value-added on state tests) and non-core (e.g., principal evaluations) 
elements to validate the full range of measures in a teacher evaluation system for a 
full range of teachers.   
For the rest of this report we will treat value-added measures as core measures 
for the purpose of assessing the reliability of the district system.  However, 
policymakers may choose other approaches that either do not allow any non state-
test measures of value-added or that allow some non state-test value-added 
measures to serve as the benchmark for assessing the reliability of the other 
measures used in the evaluation system. 
Our model addresses the use of non value-added measures by examining how 
they perform in the grades and subjects in which both value-added and non value-
added evaluation data are collected.  We then extrapolate the findings from non 
value-added measures in the grades in which they are combined with value-added 
measures to their use in the grades and subjects in which value-added data cannot 
be calculated.  Because the larger proportion of most districts’ teachers teach in 
untested grades and subjects, the performance of the non value-added components 
of a district’s teacher evaluation system has a strong influence on the number of 
highly-effective teachers who can be accurately identified as exceptional in our 
model.  The importance of measuring teacher effectiveness in non-tested grades 
and subjects gives school districts a strong incentive to develop reliable and valid 
teacher evaluation measures in addition to value-added.  These measures could be 
based on student performance on other tests, on other student work, and/or on the 
assessments of school leaders, peers, parents, or students. 
The factors that influence the extent to which performance information about 
teachers in one period predicts their effectiveness in the future will vary from 
teacher to teacher and locality to locality.  We propose judging the sufficiency of 
district-developed teacher evaluation systems by identifying just seven 
parameters, permitting the computation of the proportion of a district’s teacher 
workforce that could be identified accurately for special treatment using the same 
rules for all districts.  This proportion then becomes a metric for assessing the 
effectiveness of the evaluation system.  Specifically, the proportion of highly-
effective teachers that will qualify for special treatment will depend on a) two 
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critical values adopted by policymakers (what we call exceptionality and 
tolerance), b) three correlations calculated using teacher-level data for teachers 
within each district, and c) a count of the teachers in each district who are subject 
to the full evaluation system including value-added measures and a count of the 
number who are subject only to the non value-added components (e.g., because 
they teach in untested grades and subjects).  
The first parameter that we need to identify, the exceptionality parameter, 
identifies the point in a distribution of teacher evaluation scores that singles out 
individual teachers as being exceptional and thus subject to some type of special 
treatment. The more stringent the definition of exceptionality, the fewer teachers 
who will be identified for special treatment. 
• Exceptionality is the cutoff in a teacher rank distribution that is used 
for decision-making. For example, to identify the “top 20 percent” or 
“bottom 5 percent” the exceptionality parameter would be 80 percent 
and 5 percent respectively. 
As we have indicated previously, errors of measurement are endemic in nearly 
all assessments of complex human performance.  Measures of teacher performance 
will not be nearly as reliable as measures of teacher height, for example.  Because 
the degree of noise in measures of teacher performance can be quantified, 
policymakers are put in a position of needing to decide how tolerant they wish to 
be of two offsetting types of errors—over-inclusion and under-inclusion.   
Some policymakers may wish to be very certain that the teachers identified as 
exceptional are truly exceptional.  These policymakers would have low tolerance 
for classifying teachers as exceptional whose true performance level falls below the 
cutoff for exceptionality in the recognition program.  These policymakers are 
intolerant of over-inclusion. Other policymakers may want to be very certain that 
errors of measurement do not result in excluding teachers from the exceptional 
category who truly belong there. They are tolerant of over-inclusion because they 
want to minimize errors of under-inclusion. Since errors of under-inclusion and 
over-inclusion are countervailing, policymakers can’t have their cake and eat it too.  
They have to decide whether to equate the probability of the two types of errors or 
to favor reduction in one type of error at the cost of increasing the other.  
Statistically, the value of the tolerance parameter that produces the lowest 
number of classification errors creates an equal probability of errors of over- and 
under-inclusion.  That value is .5, and we have set that as the default in our 
subsequent spreadsheet calculator.  There might be occasions when policymakers 
would want to select a different value, perhaps to align the tolerance parameter for 
assessing the evaluation system itself with the one used to make decisions about 
individual teachers within a district system.  That said, we expect there will be 
little reason to alter the default value at the state or federal level for the purposes of 
determining the degree to which districts pass muster.  We introduce the tolerance 
parameter here primarily to expose the mechanics and conceptual model 
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underlying our calculator and to drive home the point that errors of measurement 
are inescapable in systems that attempt to evaluate complex human performance 
and require decisions on how they are to be handled.   
• Tolerance represents how willing policymakers are to risk an error of 
over-inclusion. It is the probability that the average teacher in the group 
defined by the exceptionality parameter does not actually belong in the 
exceptional category based on his or her true performance.  
The Correlation parameters are the simple correlations between a) the full 
evaluation scores for the teachers for whom value-added can be calculated in one 
year or more years (baseline) and their value-added test scores in the subsequent 
year (outcome); b) the evaluation scores of these same teachers calculated without 
the value-added component for the same baseline years(s)  and their value-added 
scores in the outcome year; and c) the value-added scores of these same teachers in 
the outcome year and the year just preceding. 
The first of these correlations, which we will refer to as the full evaluation 
correlation,  indicates the strength of the observed relationship between teachers’ 
scores on a district’s full teacher evaluation system and subsequent student 
achievement gains (value-added).  Higher values are more desirable. The 
components in the complete evaluation system would include value-added as well 
as non value-added components such as classroom observations and evaluations 
by administrators.  The components would be weighted as they are in the 
evaluation system that is actually deployed or will be deployed by the district.  The 
number of years of data used as a baseline for evaluating teachers would also be 
the one deployed by the district.  It could be a minimum of one year.  The full 
evaluation correlation indicates the degree to which this total, composite 
evaluation score from one or more previous years predicts value-added for the 
same teachers the next year.   
Imagine an Excel spreadsheet:  Each row represents a teacher in a district for 
whom full evaluation scores are available for the most recent year for which state-
mandated student assessment scores are available and for as many preceding years 
as the district wishes to employ in generating a baseline evaluation score.  Each 
teacher’s aggregate evaluation score for the baseline year(s) is represented in one 
column and that teacher’s aggregate value-added score in the subsequent and most 
recent year is represented in the second column.  The full evaluation correlation is 
the simple Pearson’s r between those two columns of data. 
The second correlation, which we will refer to as the non value-added 
correlation, indicates the strength of the observed relationship between teachers’ 
scores on the non value-added components of the district’s full teacher evaluation 
system in the baseline year(s) and value-added in those teachers’ classrooms in the 
outcome year.  
Value-added cannot be calculated for teachers in untested grades and subjects.  
Such teachers represent the majority of the workforce in most districts.  How can 
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the evaluation system that is applied to these teachers be evaluated fairly across 
districts? The non value-added correlation addresses this question by assuming 
that the relationship that exists between value-added and an alternative teacher 
performance instrument, for example a classroom observation, for teachers for 
whom both measures are collected also applies in the case of teachers in subjects 
where value-added measures are not available.  For instance, we would assume 
that the correlation between observationally-based ratings of teachers and value-
added in math would be the same in history, where value-added measures are not 
available.‡
Operationally, the non value-added correlation is collected for the same 
teachers in a district for whom the full evaluation correlation is calculated.  These 
are the teachers who are subject to the complete evaluation system for whom 
value-added can be calculated in the outcome year.  The correlation coefficient 
would be calculated between the composite of the non value-added components of 
the evaluation score for these teachers in the baseline year(s) and the value-added 
component of those teachers’ evaluation score for the next year, i.e., the outcome 
year. In order to increase the predictive power of the non value-added 
components, a district might choose to use more years of data on those 
components than it does for the value-added component.  That is acceptable in our 
model.  The only caveat is that the conditions the district sets on the data it uses to 
generate the correlation for the non value-added components have to be the 
conditions the district uses for its actual decision making system.  The non value-
added correlation coefficient estimates the degree to which the non value-added 
components of the teacher evaluation system, e.g., classroom observations and 
administrator ratings, predict future value-added. 
  
The third correlation, which we will call the value-added correlation, estimates 
the reliability of the value-added measure itself.  The first two correlations express 
the observed predictive relationship between evaluation scores and value-added.  
We are expressing these relationships with simple correlations that can range 
between r = .00 (no association whatsoever) and r = 1.00 (teachers’ value-added 
scores are perfectly predicted by their evaluation scores).  But even if the true 
underlying relationship between evaluation scores in a baseline period and value-
added the next were a perfect r = 1.00, we would not see anything close to that 
coefficient in the observed correlation unless the value-added measure itself were 
perfectly reliable.  However, we know and have described previously many 
sources of noise in measures of value-added, e.g., student gain scores on 
standardized assessments capture imperfectly what students have learned from 
their teacher; teachers may improve from one year to the next.  Thus the maximum 
values of the first two correlations (the full evaluation correlation and the non 
value-added correlation) are constrained by the reliability of the value-added 
measure itself.   
                                                 
‡ This assumption could be evaluated by occasional testing of students in subjects that are not 
typically tested year after year. 
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Imagine early astronomers trying to fix the coordinates of dim stars at 
particular times of year using a crude telescope.  Before deciding how much stars 
actually change their positions as observed from earth, it would be important to 
know the reliability of the telescope itself.   If objects appear to move in the 
telescope based on errors of refraction in the glass itself, it would prudent to adjust 
for those errors before drawing conclusions about true celestial movements.   
We use the correlation of value-added between the outcome year and the 
preceding year to estimate the reliability of the value-added measure.  Just as we 
would want to assess the astronomer’s model of annual changes in the coordinates 
of stars by adjusting for what the telescope can reliably detect, so too do we want 
to assess a district’s evaluation system by asking how much it can account for of 
what it can detect as the persistent year to year contribution of teachers to student 
achievement.  
We do this by adjusting upward the full evaluation correlation and the non 
value-added correlation to take into account the reliability in the value-added 
measure. For example, suppose the full evaluation correlation accounted for 20 
percent of variability in the outcome year’s value-added scores, whereas value-
added scores from the preceding year accounted for only 40 percent of the 
variability in the next year’s value-added scores.   In this case, the full evaluation 
correlation would have accounted for 50 percent (20% / 40%) of the persistent 
relationship between value-added from one year to the next.  The full evaluation 
correlation would be adjusted upward to reflect this.  The technical details of this 
adjustment are described in the appendix.   
Operationally, the value-added correlation is calculated on a district-by-district 
basis for the same teachers from whom the first two correlations are derived.  We 
use a district-level adjustment rather than a standard adjustment for all districts 
because districts differ in the reliability of the value-added component of their 
evaluation systems for a number of reasons, including the statistical model that is 
used to adjust for student and school background variables, the quality of the state 
assessments, and the heterogeneity of the teachers for whom value-added has been 
calculated.    
• The Number parameters are a) the number of teachers in a district’s 
present workforce that is subject to the same full evaluation system that 
was used to calculate the correlation parameters, and b) the number of 
teachers in a district’s present workforce that is subject only to the non 
value-added components of the district’s evaluation system (the same 
non value-added components that were used to generate the correlation 
parameters).  
Because the reliability of the teacher evaluation system differs for the teachers 
who are subject to the full system vs. only parts of the system, we need to know 
the number in each category to calculate the overall identification rate for 
exceptional teachers.  Districts will typically have teachers in their workforce who 
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do not fall into either the full evaluation or the non value-added evaluation 
category.  For example, many novice teachers will not have had enough time on 
the job to be subject to the evaluation system, and part-time teachers or teachers 
serving primarily in administrative roles may not be subject to the system.  Such 
teachers should not be included in calculating the number parameters, which is to 
say that our model for identifying exceptional teachers applies only to teachers 
who are subject to the evaluation system for which reliability can be calculated in 
our model.  This means that if there are two identical districts except that one 
manages to include more teachers in its evaluation system than the other, then the 
more inclusive district will be able to identify more teachers as exceptional.  
 
A worked example: Application to America’s Teacher Corps 
We have previously described an earlier report from this task group 
recommending a program called America’s Teacher Corps (ATC).  We will use 
some of the details in that proposal to work through an example of how the model 
we have proposed could be applied.   
The ATC proposal recommended that the federal government provide funds to 
school districts to augment the salary of teachers who are in the top quartile of the 
performance distribution and serve in high poverty schools. Thus the 
exceptionality parameter in our model is set at the 75th percentile for the ATC.   
The ATC proposal did not touch on the issue of errors of over- and under-
inclusion.  For this example we will use the 50 percent tolerance value. As we have 
indicated previously, this particular tolerance value equalizes the number of over- 
and under-inclusion errors and minimizes the total number of errors.  The 50 
percent value also maximizes the average difference in teachers’ contribution to 
student achievement between teachers in each identified group, meaning that the 
value-added of ATC identified teachers is as large as possible relative to non-ATC 
teachers. 
Having established the exceptionality and tolerance parameters, we can 
calculate how many teachers would be eligible for the ATC given the three 
correlation coefficients we have previously described (full evaluation, non value-
added, and value-added) and the number of teachers in a district subject to the full 
evaluation system vs. only the non value-added components of the evaluation 
system.  Districts will typically rely on a suite of performance measures, such as 
principal or peer observations and value-added.  But regardless of the system they 
use to identify teachers, the proportion of teachers that will be ATC-eligible rises 
with the correlation between the performance metric in the baseline year(s) and 
teacher value-added in the next. 
We illustrate what this might look like for actual school systems by drawing 
values for the required correlations from prior research.  Studies of the stability of 
correlations of teacher evaluation measures across years find different values in 
different states.  For example, Goldhaber and Hansen9 find much higher 
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correlations in North Carolina for elementary school math and reading value-
added estimates than are reported by Harris and Sass10
The Harris and Sass report found a correlation of 0.40 between evaluation 
scores from two baseline years and value-added in the subsequent year for Florida 
elementary school teachers, where the evaluation scores combined value-added 
and principal evaluations.  We will use that value for our full evaluation 
correlation.  The same study found a correlation of 0.18 between principal ratings 
of teachers and value-added scores in the subsequent year.  We will use that as our 
non value-added parameter.  The multi-district Measures of Effective Teaching 
project being carried out by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation found that 
teacher value-added in mathematics correlated 0.40 from one year to the next 
whereas the corresponding correlation in English language arts was 0.20.
 using Florida data.  To be 
conservative we will use lower range estimates in our example.  
11
We have developed a spreadsheet based on our model, which can be 
downloaded 
  Later 
we describe why two years of baseline data are preferable to one, including that 
the correlations tend to be higher.  But for our worked example, we will take the 
average of these two year-to-year correlations, 0.30, as the value for our value-
added correlation.   
here.§
 
  Users enter values such as those chosen as illustrative above.  
An example of the spreadsheet using the values described above is presented in 
the next two figures.  The first figure presents the portion of the spreadsheet in 
which values are entered by the user.  The number of teachers subject to the total 
evaluation system vs. only the non valued-added portions of the district’s teacher 
pool is set at 400 and 600 respectively for this example.  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                 
§ http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/0426_evaluating_teachers.aspx  
The multi-district 
Measures of 
Effective Teaching 
project… found 
that teacher 
value-added in 
mathematics 
correlated 0.40 
from one year to 
the next whereas 
the corresponding 
correlation in 
English language 
arts was 0.20. 
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Figure 1 – Continued 
 
 
The next figure, Figure 2, presents the results that are calculated based on the 
values entered and displayed in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2 
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Under this scenario, this school district is capable of identifying 8.3 percent of its 
total workforce, i.e., 83 out of the 1000 teachers subject to the evaluation system, as 
sufficiently exceptional to be eligible for ATC status.  This percentage is far less 
than the 25 percent that is set as the exceptionality parameter by policymakers.  
The difference is due to the unreliability of the district’s evaluation system as a 
measure of the persistent value-added performance of its teachers.  The more 
reliable the evaluation system (i.e., the stronger the correlation of evaluation scores 
in one year with the persistent teacher value-added effect), the greater the 
proportion of teachers who can be identified, up to the theoretical limit of 25 
percent that is set by the exceptionality parameter. 
This relationship of number of teachers who can be identified and the 
reliability of the measures is highlighted in Figure 2 by the difference in the 
identification rate for teachers who are subject to the full evaluation system vs. 
teachers who are subject only to the non value-added components (in this case just 
principal ratings).  Recall that the full evaluation correlation is 0.40 whereas the 
non value-added correlation is only 0.18.  These differences lead to 17.7 percent of 
the teachers subject to the full evaluation system being identifiable as exceptional 
whereas only 2.1 percent of those subject to only the non value-added evaluation 
are identifiable. 
The relationship between measure reliability and the number of teachers who 
can be identified as exceptional is illustrated for the full range of values of 
reliability in Figure 3.  Here the values on the vertical axis represent the proportion 
of teachers who can be identified up to the exceptionality parameter used in our 
ATC example, 25 percent.  The horizontal axis represents the first number column 
in the spreadsheet in Figure 2 and represents the amount of variance in the 
persistent teacher value-added estimate explained by the evaluation score: the 
lower the number, the lower the explanatory power—the higher the number, the 
better the prediction.   
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Although there is considerable measurement error in the evaluation system we 
are illustrating, the decisions it supports are robust under our model because the 
number of teachers who can be identified is directly determined by the reliability 
of the measures.  For instance, in Figure 3 one can see that district A’s evaluation 
system which explains 50 percent of the teacher-level variance would be able to 
identify approximately 160 of the district’s 1000 teachers as being the top 25 
percent; whereas, district B’s evaluation system only captures approximately 25 
percent of the teacher-level variance and would only allow approximately 90 of the 
1000 teachers to be identified. 
What does this mean in terms of the actual performance of those who fall into 
the identified or not identified categories?  Note from the spreadsheet in Figure 2 
that for our illustrative case the average identified teacher subject to the full 
evaluation system is 1.3 standard deviations more effective in raising student 
achievement than the average non-identified teacher (the difference between the 
last two columns).  A standard deviation of difference among teachers in their 
effectiveness corresponds to about a month of student learning during one year of 
elementary school.12  Thus in the scenario we have illustrated, which uses plausible 
values drawn from the empirical literature, the average progress for children in the 
classrooms of teachers in the year after their identification as exceptional teachers 
via the full evaluation system is equivalent to about 5 weeks more schooling than 
for students in the classrooms of the other teachers in the district. 
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This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the link between the 
degree to which the evaluation score predicts subsequent value-added and the 
difference in student gain produced by identified and non-identified teachers for 
the full range of possible values for the ATC case.  Note that an evaluation system 
that approached a perfect correlation with the persistent component of teacher 
value-added would generate about a .25 standard deviation difference in student 
learning between identified and non-identified teachers in the year after 
identification.  This is a difference of about one-quarter of a year of schooling.**
 
 
This illustrates, again, the importance of developing sophisticated teacher 
performance evaluation systems, be they for the purpose of implementing the ATC 
concept or for the myriad high-stakes purposes promised, for instance, in states’ 
Race to the Top applications.   
Figure 4 
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** It is important to note that many reports of the strength of teacher effects based on value-added are 
based on estimates from the same year(s) of data, whereas our model and examples are based on 
predictions to the next year from data collected in the previous year.  Correlations between value-
added estimates in one year and performance in subsequent years decay over time, but are still 
statistically significant 9 years later.  The correlations are much higher and the decay in magnitude 
stabilizes after 5 years if the initial estimates are based on two years rather than one year of data.  
Goldhaber, D. & Hansen, M. (2010). Assessing the potential of using value-added estimates of teacher job 
performance for making tenure decisions. (Washington, DC: CALDER, The Urban Institute). 
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A technical presentation of the rationale and calculations for the material in the 
figures and the associated spreadsheet calculator is found in the appendix of this 
document.   
 
Questions and Answers 
Q1.  Should districts identify exceptional teachers in different proportions in the 
tested vs. untested grades and subjects based on the different identification 
rates from your model?  
A1.  Doing so increases the accuracy of prediction but may be undesirable for other reasons. 
Districts may well not wish to identify different proportions of teachers from the 
tested grades and subjects vs. the non-tested grades and subjects as exceptional 
simply because the prediction correlations are different for these two categories.  
There is no conceptual reason to believe that greater proportions of elementary 
school teachers are exceptional than high school teachers, for example.  That more 
elementary school teachers can be identified than high school teachers within the 
same margin of error is simply an artifact of value-added being available for some 
elementary school grades but for few high school grades and subjects.   
In many districts only about 20 percent of the teacher workforce is deployed in 
tested grades and subjects.  Providing disproportionate access to recognition and 
reward for teachers who happen to be subject to a district’s full evaluation system 
could have unintended negative consequences such as incentivizing teachers to 
teach in the tested vs. non-tested grades and subjects or in undermining the sense 
of fairness in the evaluation process as a whole.  
We expect that many districts would want to provide equitable access to 
incentive and recognition programs across all categories of teaching while 
recognizing that a higher rate of misclassification will occur for categories of 
teachers for whom the full suite of evaluation data are not available.  The implicit 
tradeoff between equity of access and accuracy of prediction can be reduced by 
including a greater proportion of the teacher workforce in the full evaluation 
system and by including more years of baseline data for predictions for the non 
value-added components of the evaluation system. 
The one requirement of our model is that districts use their evaluation scores 
within each teacher category to identify exceptional teachers.  Thus a district may 
decide to provide a recognition program for junior teachers that recognizes a 
higher proportion of junior teachers than does a recognition program for more 
senior teachers.  The reason for doing so might be to increase the retention rate of 
high performing junior teachers.  This could be a worthwhile objective 
notwithstanding the fact that the full evaluation correlation is greater for senior 
teachers.  Or a district might decide to provide equal probability of recognition to 
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teachers in untested and tested grades and subjects despite the different 
misclassification rates that result.  That is acceptable as we frame policy and 
administrative uses of our model, as long as teachers are selected in rank order 
within their category based on their evaluation score. 
Q2.  Would your model apply to selecting low performing teachers for special 
treatment?   
A2.  In general, yes, but some specifics would change. 
Our model and the associated calculator can be used to estimate the number of 
teachers who could be identified and their contribution to student value-added for 
either tail of the distribution and for any value of exceptionality.  For example, if a 
district wanted to identify the lowest 5 percent of its teachers in terms of their true 
contribution to value-added for intensive remediation, they could use our 
calculator, enter 95 percent as the exceptionality parameter, and simply change the 
numerical signs and descriptors for the output in the last two columns, e.g., “SDs 
above average” to “SDs below average.”  Using all the other values entered into 
our previous worked example, but changing exceptionality from .25 to .95, 
generates the following output: 
 
The necessary changes to the headings and signs to make the output relevant 
for low performers follow: 
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This output makes clear the difficulty of reliably identifying appreciable 
numbers of teachers in the extreme tails of the distribution for special treatment 
based on their evaluation score assuming correlations similar to those we have 
employed as examples.  In this case whereas the target is 5 percent, or 50 teachers 
in a district of 1000, only 5 can be reliably identified.  Here is a case in which a 
change in the tolerance factor might be required.  For example, by increasing the 
tolerance value from 50 percent to 75 percent, the number of teachers who could be 
identified rises from 5 to 22, or to roughly half of the theoretical target of 50 
teachers.  Increasing the tolerance for over-identification while reducing the 
tolerance for under-identification may be a reasonable policy decision with respect 
to interventions for very low-performing teachers.   
Q3.  What is the optimal number of years of baseline evaluation data for making 
selection decisions and for passing muster? 
A3.  There is no optimal number of years of baseline data.  The advantage of additional 
years of data or additional data in any form in improving prediction has to be weighed 
against the costs of collecting such data and the practical needs of decision making.   
Our worked example is based on two or three years of data: one or two baseline 
years of evaluation data used to predict a subsequent year’s value-added.  Some 
districts have more years of evaluation data on some teachers; some less.  Inclusion 
of more data points for individual teachers will increase the precision of 
prediction.  Further, using at least two years of data for the baseline period 
substantially reduces the biases that can occur in the assignment of students to 
teachers in a single year, e.g., an unusually disruptive student who depresses a 
teacher’s ability to create good conditions for learning for all the students in the 
classroom.  However, the practical realities of personnel decisions may require 
time frames that are shorter than those that are optimal for the most accurate 
decisions, e.g., ten years of data would allow much more accurate predictions than 
two years of data but districts should not wait 10 years to evaluate their teachers.  
We leave these design details to districts with the understanding that the more 
data they collect the better their predictions are likely to be, and the better their 
predictions the greater the proportion of evaluated teachers that can be identified 
as exceptional under our model. 
Q4.  Which model for calculating value-added do you recommend? 
A4.  For the purposes of this report, we do not prefer any particular value-added model. 
All teacher value-added models start with the gain scores of individual students 
on academic assessments that are associated with the time period when those 
students are the responsibility of a particular teacher.  A large number of statistical 
adjustments are then possible to try to remove influences on student achievement 
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that are not the effect of the teacher.  For example, classrooms with more 
economically disadvantaged students may, on average, show higher or lower rates 
of growth than classrooms of more advantaged students, so value-added models 
often adjust for that variable and other student background characteristics that 
reflect the mix of students in a particular teacher’s classrooms.  Adjustments can 
also be made for school characteristics, for district characteristics, for attendance, 
and other factors.  There are typically several ways of calculating the effects of 
variables regardless of which variables are included in the value-added model.  
Further, models that are formally very similar can produce different results 
depending on the number of years of prior data on student achievement that are 
used as an adjustment for student background.   There is as yet no clear consensus 
among the econometricians and statisticians who construct these models as to 
which is best.  Further, models that may be superior technically can fail as 
management tools or face political or public challenges because they are difficult 
for anyone except specialists to understand.††
Because of the unsettled nature of the engineering of value-added models and 
the tension between technical strength and public transparency we do not 
recommend a particular value-added model.  However, we believe there is now a 
sufficient body of research to recommend that the most important adjustment in a 
value-added model is the inclusion of student achievement from prior years, e.g., 
adjusting for how much a 6th grade teacher’s students learned in 5th and 4th grade.
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Q5.  Is the passing muster model useful for anything in addition to the task of 
identifying exceptional teachers?    
  
Although the design of value-added models clearly matters, we believe that for the 
broad purposes of passing muster, which is intended to require only a light hand 
from the federal or state level, it is better to leave those design decisions to 
responsible education authorities. 
A5.  Yes.  There are a number of possible uses for both policy and management decisions. 
We have built our narrative around federal and state programs that provide 
incentives to local education agencies to recognize exceptional teachers.  However, 
the model we have put forward could be used to create conditions for funding 
broader education programs that are predicated on school districts having 
meaningful teacher and principal evaluation systems.  For example, the Obama 
administration has identified improved teacher and principal effectiveness as a 
centerpiece of its plans for reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA).14
                                                 
†† For an example of the clash between ease of understanding and technical sophistication see: 
Michael Winerip, “Evaluating New York teachers, perhaps the numbers do lie,” The New York Times, 
March 7, 2011, p. A15.  
  We can imagine Congress building a requirement into 
Title I or Title II of ESEA that districts report on the reliability of their evaluation 
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system using our model as a foundation.  With those data available for every 
school district in the nation, we could imagine states taking the next step and 
determining threshold values of evaluation reliability that districts would be 
expected to meet.  We could also see the federal government incentivizing states or 
districts to reach threshold values or to demonstrate improvement in the reliability 
of their evaluation systems.   
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Technical Appendix: Standard-Setting for Value-added Based 
Teacher Identification Systems  
This appendix provides the technical details underlying our approach to 
evaluating the reliability of a teacher evaluation system, and the related question of 
how state or federal teacher recognition programs can accommodate district 
evaluation systems of differing quality. We approach this question as a Bayesian 
decision problem: Based on an imprecise teacher evaluation, we must (1) form 
posterior beliefs about each teacher’s effectiveness and then (2) base decisions 
about recognition on these posterior beliefs in a way that minimizes mistakes. The 
key insight is that decisions should be made based on posterior beliefs, and these 
beliefs are more precise when the teacher evaluation system is more reliable 
allowing us to recognize more teachers while making fewer mistakes.  
The appendix is organized into four sections. The first section formalizes our 
approach using a simple model. The second section shows how posterior beliefs 
can be formed about teacher effectiveness, and how these relate to the reliability of 
the evaluation. The third section develops a simple method that can be used to 
estimate the reliability of the teacher evaluations from district data. The final 
section shows how this information can be used to select teachers for recognition in 
a way that minimizes mistakes.  
 
1. A Simple Model for the Evaluation of Teacher Evaluation Systems 
 
Our goal is to identify teachers whose effectiveness, defined as the effect they have 
on student test scores, is above some threshold. For this example, we will consider 
a threshold at the 75th percentile of teacher effectiveness, so that only the top 25 
percent of teachers would truly exceed this threshold if we had a perfectly reliable 
evaluation. We assume that the impact of teacher (j) on student test scores is the 
teacher effect (μj) in the following value-added model:  
 
Equation 1: ijcjcjijcijc XA εθµβ +++=  
 
Where Xijc represents variables that control for student (and potentially peer) 
factors such as prior test scores, μj is the teacher effect, θjc is an idiosyncratic effect 
on student scores in a given classroom (c) of students, and εijc is a student-level 
idiosyncratic residual. We will assume that the teacher effect is normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 2µσ . 
Districts cannot observe the teacher effect (μj) directly, but instead must 
evaluate teachers based on a variety of imperfect measures such as value-added 
estimates, classroom observations, etc.  Suppose that a district uses whatever 
information they have available to create an overall evaluation score (Sj) for each 
teacher. This score could be formed in any way, such as based on informal reviews 
by principals, or formal composite measures based on multiple measures of 
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teacher performance. We will assume that the evaluation score is continuous and 
normally distributed, but if this were not the case the ideas here would generalize 
(although some of the specifics would differ). For simplicity, we will also assume 
that the evaluation of all teaches is based on the same information—e.g., all 
teachers are evaluated based on classroom observations and value-added 
estimates.  
 
2. Posterior Beliefs and the Reliability of Teacher Evaluation 
 
We can summarize our posterior beliefs about μj after observing Sj as: 
 
Equation 2:
 
jjj S ναµ +=  
 
Where the posterior mean is αjS , and the posterior variance is ( ) 2νσν =jVar .  
Thus, α represents the increase in average teacher value-added associated with a 
one point increase in the overall evaluation score, while 2vσ represents the amount 
of remaining variation in the teacher effect among teachers with a given score.  
With an assumption that teacher effects are normally distributed, the mean and 
variance summarize the posterior distribution (again, the ideas here would 
generalize without normality). Note that we are assuming the same posterior 
variance for everyone, i.e., that the evaluation score (Sj) provides the same amount 
of information for all teachers. 
A simple statistic summarizes the quality of Sj in terms of how much it 
improves our ability to predict the teacher effect: 
 
Equation 3:
 
( )
22
22
2
µµ
νµ
σ
α
σ
σσ SVarR =
−
=  
 
This statistic is analogous to the teacher-level R-squared statistic, i.e., the 
percentage of the variance in the teacher effect on student test scores that was 
explained by the evaluation score (Sj). The square root of this statistic is the 
correlation between the evaluation score (Sj) and the teacher effect on test scores 
(μj): 
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Equation 4:
 
( ) ( )22,
µσ
αµ SVarRSnCorrelatio ==  
The more strongly correlated the score is with the teacher effect, the more 
reliable is the evaluation. We discuss how to estimate this statistic from a district’s 
data below. 
The R-squared statistic in Equation 3 is directly related to the posterior 
uncertainty about a teacher’s effectiveness. One can rearrange Equation 3 to write 
the posterior standard deviation as 21 R−= µν σσ . Thus, the closer the R-
squared is to one, the more precise our posterior beliefs are relative to the total 
variation across teachers. 
 
3. Estimating the Reliability of Teacher Evaluations from District Data 
 
There are a number of ways to use district data to estimate the correlation between 
the teacher evaluation score and teacher impacts on test scores. Plugging Equation 
2 into Equation 1 yields: 
 
Equation 5:  
 
ijcjcjjijcijc SXA εθναβ ++++=  
 
Note that this is just a value-added model that includes Sj as an additional 
regressor. In principal, one could estimate the posterior mean ( αjS ) and variance 
( 2νσ ) by estimating Equation 5 using hierarchical linear models (HLM), and then 
use these to calculate the correlation in Equation 4 (noting that 
( ) 22 νµ σασ += jSVar ). This HLM approach could be difficult to implement in 
practice, since it requires student-level data, multiple classrooms per teacher (to 
separately identify the classroom-level effect from the teacher effect), and a teacher 
evaluation score that was constructed in a different year (so that it is not correlated 
with the errors in equation 5).  
A simpler method is the following. Suppose that a district can provide 3 pieces 
of information for each teacher: 
1. The evaluation score (Sj,t) from a given year (t). 
2. A value-added estimate from the same year (VAj,t). The value-added 
estimate for each teacher is the average residual over all of their 
students, using the residual  from a value-added regression as specified 
in Equation 1: 
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==
µεθµβ  
So that the value-added estimate is equal to the teachers true impact on 
test scores (μj) plus some estimation error.  
3. A similar value-added estimate from a different year (VAj,s), where this 
could be the year after. 
The simple correlation between the evaluation score and the teacher’s value-
added in the same year will be biased because both the evaluation score and 
teacher’s value-added will be influenced by idiosyncratic factors that occurred 
during that year (i.e., because the evaluation score depends on this year’s 
performance, it will be correlated with the idiosyncratic student and classroom 
errors in Equation 1. To avoid this bias, we use the correlation between the 
evaluation this year and value-added in a different year: 
( ) ( )tjsjjtjsj SerrorCorrSVACorr ,,,, ,, += µ . However, this correlation is the 
correlation between the evaluation score and the noisy estimate of the teacher 
effect on test scores, not the correlation with the true teacher effect on test scores as 
defined in Equation 4. Because of the noise in the value-added estimate, this 
correlation will understate the true correlation.  
It is straightforward to show that to correct for this bias, we must adjust the 
correlation for the proportion of the variation in the value-added measure that is 
due to the true teacher effect, as opposed to estimation error (the reliability of the 
value-added measure). One simple estimate of the reliability of the value-added 
measure is the correlation in the value-added measure from one year to the next 
( ( )tjsj VAVACorr ,, , ). Using this estimate for the reliability of the value-added 
measure, we can construct an adjusted estimate of the correlation between the 
evaluation score and the true teacher effect on test scores using: 
 
Equation 6:
 
( ) ( )( )tjsj
tjsj
tjj VAVACorr
SVACorr
SCorr
,,
,,
, ,
,
, =µ  
 
Thus, we can estimate the correlation between a district’s evaluation measure 
and teacher effects on test scores based simply on information about the 
correlation of the evaluation measure with value-added in a different year, and the 
correlation of value-added from one year to the next. 
 
4. Selecting Teachers to Minimize Mistakes 
 
For any given evaluation system, we can calculate the posterior distribution for 
each teacher based on the model just described and methods that will be described 
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below. Given the posterior distribution, how should we decide whether any 
teachers (and if so, how many) should be eligible for top-25 percent recognition? 
The general answer to this question from a technical perspective is that 
eligibility should just depend on the likelihood that a teacher exceeds a specified 
threshold based on each teacher’s posterior distribution. As discussed above, the 
posterior distribution for each teacher’s effect (μj) is a normal distribution with 
mean αjS  and variance 
21 R−= µν σσ . Therefore, we can use the posterior 
distribution to calculate the probability that each teacher is below the threshold for 
recognition. All that needs to be determined is the threshold above which teachers 
are recognized for exceptional performance (the exceptionality parameter) and the 
minimum probability of being below the threshold that one is willing to tolerate 
when identifying any teacher as exceptional (the tolerance parameter), i.e., the 
willingness to classify a teacher as exceptional who does not actually belong in the 
exceptional category based on his or her true performance. 
The exceptionality parameter is a policy choice. For ATC, we have chosen to 
focus on recognizing teachers who are in the top quartile (top 25 percent) of all 
teachers in terms of raising student test scores. Therefore, we set the threshold at 
the 75th percentile of the distribution of teacher effects, which is equal to µσ×67.0  
(based on the normal distribution). 
The tolerance parameter is more of a technical choice, driven by the relative 
costs of making errors of omission (not rewarding a teacher who is truly in the top 
25 percent) versus errors of commission (rewarding a teacher who is not actually in 
the top 25 percent).  We chose a tolerance of 50 percent, meaning that to be selected 
for ATC the teacher must have at least a 50 percent chance of being in the top 
quartile (or, equivalently, every ATC teacher has no more than a 50 percent chance 
of lying below the 75th percentile of teacher effectiveness). A tolerance of 50 
percent minimizes the total number of errors—the total number of teachers who 
are misclassified due to errors of omission or commission. If the cost of incorrectly 
rewarding a non-exceptional teacher were higher than the cost of incorrectly 
overlooking an exceptional teacher, one would want to set a lower tolerance. For 
example, a tolerance of 10 percent would ensure that any teacher selected for ATC 
had at least a 90 percent chance of having true performance above the 75th 
percentile. While this standard would reduce the chance of rewarding a teacher 
who is not actually in the top quartile, it would reward many fewer teachers and 
thereby increase errors of omission—omitting many more teachers whose 
performance was actually in the top quartile. 
A tolerance of 50 percent results in a very simple selection rule: select any 
teacher whose posterior median (which is the posterior mean, αjS , for a normal 
distribution) exceeds the threshold for recognition. The posterior mean will not 
exceed the threshold for many teachers when the evaluation ( jS ) is an unreliable 
predictor of teacher performance. In the extreme, if the evaluation score was 
uncorrelated with teacher impacts on test scores ( 0=α ), then no teacher would 
qualify. At the other extreme, when the evaluation score is perfectly correlated 
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with teacher performance (the R-squared in Equation 3 is equal to one), the 
posterior mean will be a teacher’s true impact on test scores and we will correctly 
identify all 25 percent of teachers in the top quartile for ATC. 
More generally, for any given level of tolerance and exceptionality, there is a 
direct relationship between the reliability of the evaluation score, as summarized 
by the R-squared in Equation 3 (or, equivalently, the correlation in Equation 4), 
and the proportion of teachers who will be eligible for ATC. As the correlation 
between the evaluation scores and the teacher effects on test scores increases from 
zero to one, the proportion of teachers eligible for ATC increases from 0 to 25 
percent. Figure 3 in the main body of the paper plots this relationship, and the 
lookup tables provide the calculation of what percent of teachers should be eligible 
for any level of tolerance, exceptionality, and reliability of the teacher evaluation. 
One nice feature of this approach is that it is not an “all or nothing” approach 
that requires every district’s evaluation system to exceed a certain level of 
reliability. Instead, all districts can participate in ATC. Those with better evaluation 
systems will have more teachers eligible for ATC than those with worse evaluation 
systems.  
While all of the discussion to this point has assumed that value-added 
estimates are available for all teachers, the system can be accommodated to include 
teachers evaluated by other methods (e.g., classroom observations, student 
evaluations) in untested grades and subjects. For these teachers, we would suggest 
using results from tested grades and subjects as a guide. In particular, for teachers 
in tested grades and subjects, the district could construct an evaluation score using 
the more limited information used in untested grades and subjects (e.g., only using 
classroom observations & student evaluations, but excluding value-added). Then, 
the correlation between this limited evaluation score and teacher impacts on test 
scores could be estimated as we have discussed, and this correlation would 
determine the proportion of teachers eligible for non-tested grades and subjects. 
Because evaluations would most likely be less reliable without value-added 
information, fewer teachers would be eligible in non-tested grades and subjects if 
decisions were based entirely on the reliability of prediction.  However, we 
describe in the narrative of our report why districts might find it desirable to create 
equal opportunities for recognition among different categories of teachers even 
though this would create differences in the rate of classification errors in the 
different categories.  
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